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a b s t r a c t
The position verification problem is an important building block for a large subset of
wireless sensor network (WSN) applications. Indeed, the performance of theWSNdegrades
significantly when misbehaving nodes report false location information in order to fake
their actual position. In this paper we propose the first deterministic distributed protocol
for an accurate identification of faking sensors in a WSN. Our scheme does not rely on a
subset of trusted nodes that cooperate and are not allowed to misbehave. Thus, any subset
of nodes is allowed to try faking its position. As in previous approaches, our protocol is
based on distance evaluation techniques developed for WSN.
On the positive side, we show that when the received signal strength (RSS) technique
is used, our protocol handles at most ⌊ n2 ⌋− 2 faking sensors. When the time of flight (ToF)
technique is used, our protocol manages at most ⌊ n2 ⌋ − 3 misbehaving sensors. On the
negative side, we prove that no deterministic protocol can identify faking sensors if their
number is ⌈ n2 ⌉−1. Thus, our scheme is almost optimalwith respect to the number of faking
sensors.
We discuss application of our technique in the trusted sensor model. More specifically,
our results can be used tominimize the number of trusted sensors that are needed to defeat
faking ones.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The position verification problem is an important building block for a large subset of wireless sensor network
(WSN) applications. For example, environment and habitat monitoring [21], surveillance and tracking for military [8],
and geographic routing [13], require an accurate position estimation of the network nodes. Most of existing position
verification protocols rely on distance evaluation techniques (e.g. [1,7,9,19,23,24]). Received signal strength (RSS) [1] and
time of flight (ToF) [7] techniques are relatively easy to implement yet very precise (one or two meters). In the RSS
technique, a receiving sensor estimates the distance of the sender on the basis of sending and receiving signal strengths.
In the ToF technique, the sensor estimates distance based on message delay and radio signal propagation time. Position
verification using the aforementioned distance estimation techniques is relatively straightforward provided that all sensors
cooperate.
In the secure positioning problem we can distinguish two sets of nodes: the set of correct nodes and the set of faking
(or cheating) nodes. The goal of faking nodes is to mislead correct nodes about their real positions. More specifically, faking
nodes cooperate and corrupt the position verification protocol to convince the correct nodes about their faked positions.
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This problem can be also seen as a variation of the Byzantine agreement problem [14] in which the correct nodes have to
decide which nodes are faking their positions. Initially correct nodes do not knowwhich nodes are correct and which nodes
are faking. Faking nodes come to play in the WSN in a natural way due to several factors: a sensor node may malfunction,
inaccurate position (coordinates) estimation [1,7] may induce incorrect information, or attackers could use fake positions
to take down the network.
Related work. Most methods for secure positioning [3,4,15,16] existing in the literature rely on a fixed set of trusted
entities (or verifiers) and distance estimation techniques to filter out faking nodes. We refer to this model as the trusted
sensor (or TS) model. In this model, faking nodes may use attacks not available to regular nodes, such as radio signal
jamming or using directional antennas, which permit to implement e.g.wormhole attack [11] and Sybil attack [5]. Lazos and
Poovendran [15] present a secure range-independent localization scheme, where each sensor computes its position based
on received beacon messages from locators. Sensors compute the center of gravity of beacons’ intersection region, and
the computed location becomes the estimated location of the sensor. Probabilistic analysis of the protocol demonstrates
that it is resilient to wormhole and Sybil attacks, with high probability. Lazos et al. [16] further refine this scheme with
multilateration to reduce the number of required locators, while maintaining probabilistic guarantees. The TS model
was considered by Capkun and Hubaux [4] and Capkun et al. [3]. In [4] the authors present a protocol that relies on
a distance bounding technique. This technique was proposed by Brands and Chaum [2]. Each sensor v measures its
distance to a (potential) faking sensor u based on its message round-trip delay and radio signal propagation time, thus
enabling the faking node u only to enlarge the distance to v. Then, if the faking node is located inside the triangle formed
by verifiers and its faked position is also located within the triangle, then at least one of the three verifiers detects
an inconsistency. The protocol presented in [3] relies on a set of hidden verifiers. Each verifier v measures the arrival
time tv of the (potential) faking node transmission. Verifiers exchange all such arrival times and check consistency of
the declared position. The TS model presents several drawbacks in WSN: first the network cannot self-organize in an
entirely distributed manner, and second the trusted nodes have to be checked regularly and manually to actually remain
trusted.
Relaxing the assumption of trusted nodes makes the problem more challenging, and to our knowledge, has only been
investigated very recently by Hwang et al. [12]. We call the setting where no trusted node preexists the no trusted sensor
(or NTS) model. The approach in [12] is randomized and consists of two phases: distance measurement and filtering. In
the distance measurement phase, sensors measure their distances to their neighbors, faking sensors being allowed to
corrupt the distance measuring technique. In the filtering phase each correct sensor randomly picks up 2 so-called pivot
sensors. Next each sensor v uses trilateration with respect to the chosen pivot sensors to compute the location of its
neighbor u. If there is a match between the announced location and the computed location, the (u, v) link is added to
the network, otherwise it is discarded. Of course, the chosen pivot sensors could be faking and lying, so the protocol
may only give probabilistic guarantee. The recent work of [22] investigates the related problem of neighbor discovery,
where every participant has to find out who are its neighbors. The combination of a deterministic protocol and network
asynchrony rules out the existence of a purely algorithmic solution, so they add to each node an oracle that permits
to distinguish which neighbor claims are correct and which are not. Since the neighbor identification problem can be
seen as a subtask of the secure positioning we focus on in this paper (the actual neighbors of a node could be deduced
from the neighbors that send securely verified coordinates); this justifies the hypothesis we take here about system
synchrony.
Our results. The main contribution of this paper is a deterministic secure positioning protocol, FindMap, in the NTS model.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first fully deterministic protocol in the NTS model. The protocol guarantees that
the correct nodes never accept faked positions of the cheating nodes. The basic version of the protocol assumes that faking
sensors are not able to mislead distance evaluation techniques. The protocol correctly filters out cheating sensors provided
there are at most ⌈ n2⌉ − 2 faking sensors. Conversely, we provide evidence that in the same setting it is impossible to
deterministically solve the problem when the number of faking sensors is at least ⌈ n2⌉ − 1. We then extend the protocol to
deal with faking sensors that are also allowed to corrupt the distance measure technique (RSS or ToF). In the case of RSS,
our protocol tolerates at most ⌊ n2⌋ − 2 faking sensors (provided no four sensors are located on the same circle and no four
sensors are co-linear). In the case of ToF, our protocol may handle up to ⌊ n2⌋ − 3 faking sensors (provided no six sensors are
located on the same hyperbola and no six sensors are co-linear).
Our results have significant impact on the secure positioning problem in the TS model as well. The TS protocol presented
by Capkun et al. [3] relies on set of hidden station that detect inconsistencies between measured distance and distance
computed from claimed coordinates. The authors propose the ToF-like technique to estimate the distance. Our detailed
analysis shows that six hidden stations (verifiers) are sufficient to detect a faking node. The authors also conjecture that
the ToF-like technique could be replaced with the RSS technique. Our results answer positively to the open question of
[3], improving the number of needed stations to four. Thus, in the TS model our results can be used to efficiently deploy a
minimal number of trusted stations.
Our FindMap protocol can be used to prevent Sybil attack [5]. More specifically, eachmessage can be verified if it contains
real position (id) of its sender. Eachmessage that is found to contain faked position (id) can be discarded. Thus correct nodes
never accept messages with a faked sender position (id).
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2. Technical preliminaries
The sensors are located in the plane. We assume the NTS model, unless stated otherwise. That is, initially correct nodes
do not have any knowledge about the network. In particular, correct nodes do not know the position of other correct nodes.
Each node is aware of its own geographic coordinates, and those coordinates are used to identify nodes. TheWSN is partially
synchronous: all nodes operate in rounds. In one round every node is able to transmit exactly one message that reaches all
nodes in the network. The size of theWSN is n. Our protocol does not rely on n, since participants are unaware of the network
size. For each transmission, correct nodes use the same transmission power.
The total number of faking nodes is denoted by f . Faking nodes are allowed to corrupt protocol’s messages e.g. transmit
incorrect coordinates (and thus incorrect identifier) to the other nodes.Weassume that fakingnodesmay cooperate between
themselves in an omniscient manner (i.e. without exchanging messages) in order to fool the correct nodes in the WSN. In
the basic protocol, faking nodes cannot corrupt distance measure techniques. This assumption is then relaxed in Sections 4
and 5where faking sensors can corrupt the ranging technique. We assume however that each faking node obeys synchrony.
That is, each faking node transmits at most one message per round.
We assume that all distance-ranging techniques are perfect with respect to precision. This assumption is further
discussed in the conclusion. The distance computed by a node v to a node u based on a distance ranging technique is denoted
by dˆ(v, u). The distance computed by a node v to a node u using coordinates provided by u is denoted by d(v, u). A particular
sensor v detects inconsistency on distance (i.e. position) of sensor u if d(v, u) ≠ dˆ(v, u). Our protocols rely on detecting and
reporting such inconsistency.
In the remaining of the paper, we use two distance estimation techniques:
1. In the received signal strength (RSS) technique, we assume that each node can precisely measure the distance to the
transmitting node by Friis transmission equation (1) [17]:
Sr = Ss

λ
4πd
2
(1)
where Ss is the transmission power of the sender, Sr is the receive signal strength (RSS) of the wave at receiver, λ is wave
length and d is distance between sender and receiver.
2. The synchronous time of flight (SToF ) technique relies on propagation time of the radio signal. For this technique we
assume that sensors are synchronized by global time. Sender u attaches the time of transmission, ts to the message.
Receiver v records the message arrival time tr of the message. Next v computes the distance d = t ∗ s of u based on time
delay t = tr − ts of the message and radio signal speed s.
3. The different arrival time (DAT ) technique provides similar guarantees as SToF. The advantage of DAT over SToF is that
DAT does not require synchronization. In the DAT technique each sensor transmits its message with two types of signals
that differ on propagation speed e.g. radio signal (RF) and ultra sound signal (US). Sender sensor u transmits its message
with RF and US signal simultaneously. Receiver sensor v, which estimates its distance to sender u, records arrival time tr
of RF signal and arrival time tu of US signal from u. Then, based on the propagation speed sr of RF, propagation speed su
of US and difference of arrival times t = tu − tr sensor v can compute distance to sensor u. Eq. (2) show the relation.
t = dˆ
sr
− dˆ
su
. (2)
3. Basic protocol
In this section we present the protocol FindMap that essentially performs by majority voting. The protocol detects all
faking sensors provided n − 2 − f > f . Thus, the total number of faking sensors is at most ⌈ n2⌉ − 2. In this section we
consider the relatively simpler case where faking sensors cannot cheat on ranging techniques. That is faking nodes cannot
change its transmission power, but they can cooperate and corrupt the protocol. In Sections 4 and 5, the protocol will be
extended to the case where faking nodes corrupt the ranging technique. Our key assumption is that no three correct sensors
are co-linear. This assumption allows to formulate the following fact.
Fact 1. If a cheating sensor transmits a message with a faked position then at least one of the three correct sensors can detect an
inconsistency provided that no three sensors are co-linear (see Fig. 1).
Based on Fact 1, we can develop FindMap(k), where k is the maximum number of correct nodes which cannot detect
inconsistency. By Fact 1 at most k = 2 correct nodes will not detect inconsistency. The protocol operates in two rounds.
In Round 1 all sensors exchange their coordinates by transmitting an initial message. Next, each node v computes the
distances dˆ(v, u) (from the ranging technique) and d(v, u) (from the obtained node coordinates) of u and compare them.
If dˆ(v, u) ≠ d(v, u) then v accuses u of faking its position. Otherwise, v approves u (v believes that u is correct). To keep
record of its accusations and approvals, each node v maintains an array accusv . In Round 2 each node v transmits its array
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Fig. 1. An example showing F consistently fakes its location to F ′ against P1 and P2 . However P3 always detects an inconsistency since no three correct
sensors are co-linear.
accusv . Next, each node v counts accusations and approvals toward the node u including its ownmessages. Node v finds the
node u as faking if the number of accusations is strictly larger than number of approvals minus k.
Protocol FindMap(k) executed by node v
Round 1:
1. v exchanges coordinates by transmitting initv & receiving initu.
2. for each received message initu:
3. compute dˆ(v, u)with ranging technique and
d(v, u) using the coordinates of u.
4. if (dˆ(v, u) ≠ d(v, u)) then accusv[u] ← true
else accusv[u] ← false
Round 2:
5. v exchange accusations by transmitting accusv & receiving accusu.
6. for each received accusu:
7. for each sensor r that participated in Round 1
8. if accusu[r] = true then NumAccusr+ = 1
else NumApprover+ = 1
9. for each sensor u:
10. if (NumAccusu > NumApproveu − k) then v finds u as faking
else v finds u as correct.
Theorem 1. Each correct sensor, running protocol FindMap(k = 2), never accepts position of faking sensor provided n−f−2 > f
(at most ⌈ n2⌉ − 2 faking nodes) and no three sensors are co-linear.
Proof. Let us assume k = 2, n − f − k > f and no three sensors are co-linear. First we will show that all correct sensors
will detect each faking sensor. By Fact 1, at most k + k sensors will approve each faking sensor v (at most f faking sensors
and at most k correct sensors), and at least n − f − k correct sensors will accuse each faking sensor v. Thus the inequality
n− f − k > f + k− k in line 10 of the protocol will be true due to our assumption that n− f − k > f . So faking node v will
be identified by all correct nodes.
Next, we have to show that no correct sensor will be found faking. We can see that each correct sensor u can be accused
by at most f faking sensors and each correct sensor u will be approved by all n − f correct sensors. Thus the inequality
f > n − f − k in line 10 of the protocol will be false due to our assumption f < n − f − k. So each correct node u will be
identified as a correct one by all correct nodes. 
Next, we show that it is impossible to filter out the faking sensors when n − 2 − f ≤ f . The assumption that faking
sensors cannot corrupt the distance ranging techniquemakes this result even stronger. Our protocol is synchronous but this
impossibility result holds for asynchronous settings also.
Theorem 2. If n− f − 2 ≤ f then faking nodes cannot be identified by a deterministic protocol.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. That is we assume that deterministic protocol P , that identifies faking sensors for
n− f − 2 ≤ f , exists. The main idea of the proof is to construct two executions that are indistinguishable to sensors v and u.
In the first execution both sensors v and u have to successfully identify faking sensors. In the second execution the correct
sensors behave as if they were faking sensors in the first execution and faking sensors behave as if they were correct sensors
in the first execution. Thus, in the second execution sensors v and uwill find correct sensors as faking. This implies that no
deterministic protocol is able to identify faking sensors for n− f − 2 ≤ f . The details are as follows.
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Fig. 2. First execution.
Fig. 3. Second execution.
Let us assume that correct sensors run a protocol P , which allows to detect location of correct sensors and identify the
faking sensors even when n− f − 2 = f . In the case where n− f − 2 < f , we make some faking sensors correct to achieve
equality, and in the case where n is odd, one of the faking sensors will remain silent. Let us consider the first execution (see
Fig. 2). There are two correct sensors v and u located on the straight line l. There are two sets of sensors C-correct sensors
and F-faking sensors located on the lower half of the plane. The sizes of the sets are equal |C | = |F | = f . The sensors in
F are trying to convince sensors v and u that they are located on the other side of the straight line l symmetrically. Each
sensor in F behaves as if it was a correct sensor located symmetrically against straight line l. These sensors create set F ′ of
virtually faking sensors. More precisely, F ′ contains all the faking sensors in F with their faked coordinates. Virtual sensors in
F ′ execute the protocol as if sensors in C were faking and their correct location was in C ′, which is the symmetric reflection
of C against straight line l. Construction of the second execution will clarify why we need such behavior of sensors in F ′.
We can see that sensors v and u are not able to detect inconsistency directly on the distance of virtual faking sensors since
symmetry preserves their distances from v and u. By our assumption about correctness of the protocol P , sensors v and u
are able to verify that sensors in F ′ are faking.
Now let us consider the second execution (see Fig. 3). In the second execution sensors in C and F ′ are swapped. Thus
sensors in F has to be located on the other side of straight line l symmetrically. Now virtual faking sensors in F ′ can imitate
the first execution of the correct sensors in C . Correct sensors in C behave like virtual sensors in F ′ in the first execution.
This is because the virtual sensors in F ′ in the first execution behaved like correct sensors and additionally they claimed
that sensors from C were located in C ′ (see Fig. 3). F is really located in the previous location of C ′ and the sensors in C are
correct. Thus sensors v and u are not able to distinguish between the first and the second execution. Sensors v and u will
have to decide that C is set of faking sensors. This is because v and u have made such a decision in the first execution, v and
u are not able to distinguish between these two executions. 
4. Protocol based on RSS ranging technique
In this section we assume that sensors use the RSS technique to measure distance. We assume that each correct sensor
has a fixed common transmission signal strength of Ss. The faking sensors can change their transmission signal strength to
prevent the correct sensor from computing correct distance. Let F be a faking sensor that changes its signal strength S
′
s and
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Fig. 4. An example showing a faking sensor F can supply its suitable false position F ′ to correct sensors P1 and P2 by changing its signal strength.
sends a suitable faked position F ′ to other correct sensors v. Sensor v can estimate the distance, dˆ from the received signal
strength (RSS) by the Friis transmission equation (1) assuming, the common signal strength Ss has been used.
dˆ2 = c Ss
Sr
=⇒ dˆ2 = Ss
S ′s
d2 (3)
where c =  λ4π 2, Sr = c S′sd2 , and d is the distance from v to the actual position of F .
We show that Protocol FindMap can be adapted to this model provided that n− 3− f > f , i.e. the total number of faking
sensors is at most ⌊ n2⌋ − 2 and no four correct sensors are located on a particular circle. In this variant of the protocol, a
sensor v considers sensor u faking if the number of accusation messages for u is at least ⌈ n2⌉ − 1.
Lemma 1. Let F be a faking sensor. If F fakes its position and transmission power then the set of correct nodes that cannot detect
inconsistency is located on a circle.
Proof. Let us assume that faking sensor F , located in (xf , yf ), changes its signal strength from Ss to S
′
s and sends a
corresponding faked position (x′f , y
′
f ) to two correct sensors P1 and P2. Faked position (x
′
f , y
′
f ) reported by sensor F is
computed so that P1 and P2 cannot detect inconsistency. More precisely, (x′f , y
′
f ) is the point of intersection of the two
circles centered at Pi, for i = 1, 2, with radius dˆi, where dˆi is the distance measured by Pi with the RSS ranging technique
dˆ1
2 = Ss
S ′s
d12 and dˆ2
2 = Ss
S ′s
d22
and di is the real distance Pi to F (see Fig. 4). We can see that neither P1 nor P2 is able to detect the inconsistency of the faked
position (x′f , y
′
f ).
Let us observe that each correct sensor P such that dˆp = dp

Ss
S
′
s
, where dˆp is distance computed by P to F with RSS
and dp is the real distance P to F , is not able to detect inconsistency. Therefore, the possible location (x, y) of the point P is
(x−x′f )2+(y−y′f )2
(x−xf )2+(y−yf )2 =
Ss
S
′
s
=⇒ x2 + y2 − 2

x′f−λ2xf
1−λ2

x− 2

y′f−λ2yf
1−λ2

y+ x
′
f
2+y′f 2−λ2(xf 2+yf 2)
1−λ2 = 0 where λ =

Ss
S
′
s
.
This is an equation of a circle with respect to the given faked position F ′ of F and P1 and P2 as shown in Fig. 5. Therefore,
F pretends the faked position F ′ to the sensors which are laying only on the particular circle. 
Theorem 3. If the distance evaluation is done with the RSS technique and no four sensors are located on the same circle and no
four sensors are co-linear, then at least one out of four correct sensors detects inconsistency in the faked transmission.
Proof. By Lemma 1 and our assumption it is said that no four sensors are located on the same circle while three correct
sensors accept faked locations. This is because, a circle is uniquely determined by three points on the plane, and the fourth
sensor which is not on the circle detects inconsistency. Additionally, the faking sensor can be accepted by at most 3 correct
sensors located on the line provided the faking sensor does not change its transmission power and reports its faked position
symmetrically against the line. 
Theorem 3 allows to adjust the FindMap protocol.
Corollary 1. Each correct sensor, running the protocol FindMap(k = 3), never accepts position of the faking node, in the model
where faking sensors can corrupt the RSS ranging technique, provided n− f − 3 > f (at most ⌊ n2⌋ − 2 faking nodes) and no four
sensors are located on the same circle and no four nodes are co-linear.
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Fig. 5. An example showing a faking sensor F can lie about its position by changing the signal strength to a multiple number of correct sensors which are
laying on a particular circle.
Proof. Let us consider a faking sensor F , which fakes its transmission power. By Theorem3 in each set of four correct sensors
at most 3 sensors accept faked positions. Thus, each faking sensor will be accused by at least n − f − 3 correct sensors. By
inequality n − f − 3 > f the number of correct sensors that accuse F is at least ⌈ n2⌉ − 1 and the number of faking sensors
is at most ⌊ n2⌋ − 2. Thus, each faking sensor will be found faking and no correct sensor will be found faking. Additionally,
if faking sensor F does not change its transmission power but only lies about its position then at least one among the three
co-linear correct sensors will detect inconsistency. 
Theorem 3 can be also applied in the protocol for the model of trusted sensors. In the protocol presented in [3], we can
use Theorem 3 to find deployment of the minimum number of hidden stations required to detect faking nodes.
Corollary 2. If the four hidden stations are neither located on the same circle nor co-linear then one of the stations will always
detects a faked transmission.
More precisely, if a sensor transmits a faked position then at least one of the hidden stations detects inconsistency.
Corollary 2 remains true provided the faking node’s transmission reaches all hidden stations and it is not allowed to use
directional antennas. Since the verifiers are hidden to the faking node in the model of [3], the latter has very low chances to
consistently fake its position even with directional antennas.
5. Protocol based on ToF-like ranging techniques
We first discuss how faking sensors can corrupt the two SToF and DAT ranging techniques:
1. In the case where the SToF ranging technique is used by sensor u, u first transmits a message attaching the time of
transmission ts into the message. Sensor v, receives the message from sensor u at time tr , estimates the distance based
on delay t = tr − ts and radio signal propagation speed sr , dˆ(v, u) = sr t . So, it is possible that a faking sensor can prevent
sensor v from computing the real distance by faking the transmission time ts.
2. In the case where the DAT ranging technique is used, sensor u transmits each message simultaneously with two signals
(e.g. RF and US signals). Sensor v then records the difference of arrival time t between the RF and the US signal. This
can be done using only a local clock at v. Thus no global time is required. Then, v computes distance dˆ(v, u) based on t ,
propagation speed sr of RF signal and propagation speed su of US signal. In this case, a faking sensormay prevent a correct
sensor v from computing real distance by delaying one of the two simultaneous transmissions.
Now we show that the corrupted SToF and DAT ranging techniques have the same effect on correct sensors.
Lemma 2. If the ranging is evaluated with the SToF technique, and if the faking sensor F shifts its real transmission time, then all
correct sensors compute the real distance to sensor F increased or decreased by the same length b.
Proof. Let us assume that faked sensor F shifts its real transmission time by t ′. Then all the correct sensors will compute
the distance modified by b = sr t ′, where sr is the radio signal propagation speed. 
Lemma 3. If the ranging is evaluated with the DAT technique and faking sensor F introduces shift t ′ ≠ 0 between the RF and US
transmissions, then all correct sensors compute the real distance to sensor F , increased or decreased by the same length b.
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Fig. 6. This figure shows that sensor F can change its position to F ′ and consistently lie against sensor P3 which is located in the middle of segment FB.
Length of segment F ′B is b.
Fig. 7. We assume that |FF ′| > b. This figure shows set S of correct sensors located on the hyperbola, which cannot detect inconsistency. That is for each
correct sensor P located on the hyperbola the distance |F ′P| is equal to |FP| + b
Proof. Since the faking sensor shifts the two transmissions by time t ′ then the difference in arrival times of the signals will
be t + t ′ where t is the original difference for t ′ = 0. Each correct sensor will compute dˆ based on the following equation.
t + t ′ = dˆ
sr
− dˆ
su
.
Thus the real distance will be modified by
b = t
′
1/sr − 1/su
in all correct sensors. 
Since the corruption on SToF and DAT has the same result we can formulate the following theorem for both ranging
techniques.
Theorem 4. If the distance evaluation is done with the SToF or DAT techniques and no six sensors are located on the same
hyperbola and no six sensors are co-linear, then at least one of the six correct sensors detects inconsistency in faked transmission.
Proof. Let us assume that faking sensor F enlarges its distance against the correct sensor by b. The case when the sensor
reduces its distance is symmetric. By Lemmas 2 and 3 there are at most two faked locations F ′ and F ′′ for faking sensor F ,
which guarantee consistency against sensors P1 and P2 (see Fig. 6). Let us assume that sensor F decides for faked location F ′.
Now we will find a set of correct sensors, which will not detect inconsistency. We consider two cases:
1. The first case is when distance c between F ′ and F is strictly larger than b (see Fig. 7). Each correct sensor P , which cannot
detect inconsistency on distance to F , has to meet d(P, F) = dˆ(P, F). The condition d(P, F) = dˆ(P, F) can be transformed
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Fig. 8. We assume FF ′ ≤ b. This figure shows that faking sensor F cannot change its position to F ′ consistently against sensors P1 and P2 . That is
F ′P1 < |FP1| + b or F ′P2 < |FP2| + b allowing sensor P1 or P2 to detect inconsistency.
into the distances on the plane |F ′P| = |FP| + b. Based on this condition we can come up with a system of equations for
sensors in S = {P : d(P, F) = dˆ(P, F)}.
x2 + y2 = z2
x2 + (y− c)2 = (z + b)2 (4)
where |FP| = z, x, y are the coordinates of correct sensor P ∈ S. We assume that F = (0, 0) and F ′ = (0, c). Next, we
can find analytical description of points in S on the Eq. (4).
x2 + (y− c)2 = (

x2 + y2 + b)2
x2 + y2 − 2yc + c2 = x2 + y2 + 2b

x2 + y2 + b2
(−2yc + c2 − b2)2 = 4b2(x2 + y2)
4y2c2 − 4yc(c2 − b2)+ (c2 − b2)2 = 4b2(x2 + y2)
4y2c2 − 4yc(c2 − b2)+ (c2 − b2)2 − 4b2y2 = 4b2x2
4(c2 − b2)y2 − 4c(c2 − b2)y+ (c2 − b2)2 = 4b2x2
(c2 − b2)(4y2 − 4cy+ c2 − b2) = 4b2x2
(c2 − b2)((2y− c)2 − b2) = 4b2x2
(c2 − b2)(2y− c)2 − b2(c2 − b2) = 4b2x2
(c2 − b2)(2y− c)2 − 4b2x2 = b2(c2 − b2)
(2y− c)2
b2
− 4x
2
c2 − b2 = 1.
This is an equation of the hyperbola. The five points uniquely determine the hyperbola. Thus, if no 6 sensors are located
on a hyperbola then at most 5 correct sensors accept faked positions.
2. The second case is when distance c between F ′ and F is at most b (see Fig. 8). We will show that P1 or P2 will have to
detect inconsistency. The distance measured using coordinates by Pi, for i = 1, 2, has to be exactly |FPi| + b to prevent
sensor Pi from detecting inconsistency. By triangle inequality we have |F ′F |+|FPi| ≥ |F ′Pi| for i = 1, 2. Thus the distance
|F ′Pi|measured by Pi with a ranging technique is at most |FPi| + b. Sensor Pi for i = 1, 2 will measure required distance
when sensors F ′, F and Pi are co-linear. This will happen for at most one sensor. This is because we assume that no three
sensors are co-linear. 
Theorem 4 allows us to modify the protocol FindMap so that it works in the model in which faking sensors can corrupt
the SToF or DAT ranging technique.
Corollary 3. The protocol FindMap(k = 5) identifies all faking sensors, in the model where faking sensors can corrupt the SToF
or DAT ranging techniques, provided n − f − 5 > f and no six sensors are located on the same hyperbola and no three sensors
are co-linear.
Proof. Let us consider a faking sensor F . Theorem 4 guarantees that in each set of six correct sensors there exists a sensor
which detects inconsistency on distance to F . Thus each faking sensor will be accused by at least correct n− f − 5 sensors.
By inequality n− f − 5 > f the number of correct sensors that accuse F is at least ⌈ n2⌉− 2 and the number of faking sensors
is at most ⌊ n2⌋ − 3. Thus each faking sensor will be found faking, and no correct sensor will be found faking. 
Theorem 4 can be also applied in the protocol for the model of trusted sensors [3]. We can use Theorem 4 to compute
the deployment of the minimum number of hidden stations required to detect faking nodes.
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Corollary 4. If the six hidden stations are not located on the same hyperbola and no three stations are co-linear then one of the
stations always detect a faking node.
Corollary 4 is true provided the attacker’s transmission reaches all the hidden stations and the attacker is not allowed to
use directional antennas. Since the verifiers are hidden to faking nodes, the latter has very low chance to consistently fake
its position even with directional antennas.
6. Secure positioning in case of imperfect ranging techniques
In this paper we solve the secure positioning problem assuming a perfect ranging technique. However, for the case of RSS
ranging technique, this assumption may not hold due to the presence of noise in the network channel, that would cause in
turn signal attenuation not to necessarily follow the Friis transmission equation (1)wehave used. It is possible to incorporate
an additional noise factor (ε) that can be assumed to follow a normal (Gaussian) distribution with mean 0 and variance σ 2.
The Friis transmission equation becomes Sr = Ss

λ
4πd
2 + ε where ε ∼ N(0, σ 2). In this case every estimated distance
dˆ(v, u) using the RSS technique is expected to lie in the R range, which is a function of distance d(v, u). If dˆ(v, u) /∈ R then
v accuses u of faking its position, otherwise, v approves u.
However, we assume σ 2 to be known by all nodes. If it is unknown, each sensor can estimate it by sending signals
from known distances and measuring the deviations in received signal strengths from those expected in an ideal situation.
Checking the distribution of these deviations permits to assess whether the error distribution is indeed normal (see [10,20]
for further reference to normality tests of error distributions). If the result differs from normality, one can choose a suitable
model for the error distribution and deduce the acceptance interval using the quantiles of that distribution. Here, for the
sake of simplicity, we assume the error distribution to be normal, which is the most common and popular choice in the
literature.
Also, onemay occasionally need empirical adjustments to the basic Friis Eq. (1) using larger exponents. These are used in
terrestrial models, where reflected signals are likely to result in destructive interference, and foliage and atmospheric gases
contribute to signal attenuation [6]. In this case, one can consider Sr/Ss to be proportional to GrGs

λ
d
m, where Gr and Gs are
mean effective gain of the antennas andm is a scalar that typically lies in the range [2, 4].
7. Concluding remarks
We have proposed a secure deterministic position verification protocol for WSN that performs in the most general NTS
model. Although the previous protocol of Hwang et al. [12] for the same problem is randomized and only gives probabilistic
guarantees, it is interesting to compare the number of transmittedmessages. In [12], each sensor announces one distance at
a time in a round robin fashion. Otherwise the faking node may hold its own announcement, collects all correct nodes’
information, and sends a consistently faked distance claim. Thus the message complexity of [12] is O(n2). In our case,
2n messages are transmitted in two rounds. Thus our protocol improves both time and power used for transmissions
significantly, while providing certain results rather than probabilistic ones.
Our network model assumes that correct nodes are within the range of every other node. We believe that our majority
voting heuristic could provide robust results for arbitrary network topology. We can observe that a correct node u identifies
its faking neighbor v provided that the number of correct u’s neighbors which report inconsistency on v is strictly larger
than the number of faking u’s neighbors.
Extending our result to WSN with fixed ranges for every node is a challenging task, especially since previous results
on networks facing intermittent failures and attacks [18] are written for rather stronger models (i.e. wired secure
communications) than that of this paper.
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